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Code, 11 and Chapter 11 provides a strong, automatic stay on individual creditor action. 12 In other words, management is provided with an effective veto over creditor threats. 13 Moreover, once a Chapter 11 filing has been made, management is handed the almost exclusive right to propose the solution to the company's problems for the first 120 days after a filing, on the assumption that members of management will prefer a restructuring plan (which will save their jobs) over a sale (which may not).
14 Detailed machinery has developed over time which enables the bankruptcy judge to impose a restructuring plan on dissenting creditors, so that it can be implemented with less than unanimous consent. 15 Thus US federal bankruptcy law offers not only a strong stay against creditor action, but also a structure which incentivises restructuring rather than sale. Not surprisingly, law and economics scholars are highly critical of some of these policy choices, and a lively literature has followed. procedures, 17 only sometimes offers a moratorium on creditor action, 18 and offers a weaker moratorium where one is available at all. 19 Over the years this has been a cause of concern for English policy makers, scholars and practitioners and there has been an occasional dalliance with reform. 20 However, the powerful deposit banks, which have traditionally provided the bulk of finance to corporate Britain, have raised serious objections to reform which reflect many of the concerns of law and economics scholars in the US. First, they warn of the risk of a decrease in the availability of finance, and an increase in the cost of credit, if corporate bankruptcy law interferes significantly with secured creditor rights. Secondly, they argue that by steering creditors away from a sale, and towards restructuring, companies which should have been allowed to fail will continue in business, draining A moratorium is imposed in administration and compulsory liquidation. There is no automatic moratorium in a creditors' voluntary winding up, although it is possible to apply to court for a stay (section 112(1) Insolvency Act 1986). A moratorium is available in a company voluntary arrangement, but only for small companies satisfying 2 or more of the requirements in section 382 of the Companies Act 2006. There is no moratorium in a scheme of arrangement or receivership 19 The stay in compulsory liquidation does not prohibit enforcement by a secured creditor (in re David Lloyd & Co (1877) 6 Ch. D 339, 343-46) . The moratorium in an administration proceeding does but it does not prevent a party from terminating a contract for insolvency (Re Olympia & York [1993] BCC 154) whilst such ipso facto clauses are stayed in Chapter 11 20 Most notably the reforms introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002, discussed below these concerns have tended to trump concerns for creditors lower in corporate bankruptcy law's distributional order of priority, and powerful financial creditors have effectively been trusted to select between businesses which should be saved and businesses which should be allowed to fail.
These arguments also appeal to English lawyers' broader respect for freedom of contract, and their pathological fear of interfering too early and too extensively in contractual rights, lest England become a less attractive place to do business. 22 Recently, four significant adaptations in the finance markets have appeared to be driving the practice of restructuring in the UK and the US closer together, at least for large and larger mid-cap companies, and notwithstanding the different theoretical frameworks reflected in the law on the books. The first adaptation is the increasing globalisation and diversification of the type of creditor providing finance, particularly in the UK. 23 The second is the rise of financing arrangements in which a financial creditor has security over all, or substantially all, of the assets of the debtor, the result that large and larger mid-cap companies have significantly higher ratios of debt to equity than we might hitherto have expected. 25 The last is the development of a specialist market for the purchase of the debt of financially distressed companies in both jurisdictions. 26 Moreover, as the service sector grows in both jurisdictions, many companies are defined by cash flows rather than hard assets, and by the team of employees which goes up and down in the lift every day, so that preserving cash flow becomes a priority, there are few hard assets to enforce against and the team of employees must be kept together.
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Notwithstanding predictions that these adaptations in the finance business and assets ought to be sold in insolvency proceedings). For large and larger mid-cap companies it will propose an analytic divide between the role of corporate bankruptcy law when debts are to be restructured, on the one hand, and when assets and liabilities are to be sold to a third party for the best price reasonably obtainable (an insolvency), on the other, with the market choosing between the two. Whilst corporate bankruptcy law continues to be primarily concerned with dis-incentivising individual creditor action in an insolvency situation, in a restructuring it primarily provides a deadlock resolution procedure. The article will suggest that
there may yet be a case for reform of the law, but to address new concerns emerging in new markets, rather than to reinforce the law's response to old concerns from an old market. Finally, it will argue that the new concerns relate largely to the availability and cost of credit and, as a result, are likely to be the source of less controversy between law and economics scholars and progressive scholars, between policy makers, or between the US and the UK. In short, they largely raise empirical questions rather than philosophical ones. US restructuring law had its start at the end of the nineteenth century with the restructuring of the railroads. 34 There was a strong public interest in restructuring the railroads, which were seen as providers of prosperity and modernity.
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Moreover, a piecemeal realisation of railroad assets was unlikely to produce much of value for anyone; as Miller and Waisman put it, 'There was a broad national consensus that the troubled railroad industry must be saved, the absence of which would leave "nothing but a streak of meets the requirements of the absolute priority rule (a junior class does not recover until a senior class has recovered in full, but a senior class does not recover more than it is owed).
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Thus the legacy of the railroad era is clearly visible in Chapter 11: a positive policy of (i) reducing incentives for creditor action and (ii) promoting a restructuring over a sale of the business and assets. But, as we shall see, the UK set off down a very different track.
B Restructuring Law in the UK: 1979 to 1990
The structure of the finance market in the UK during this period was very different. It was dominated by powerful deposit-taking or 'clearing' banks which provided the vast bulk of finance in the economy. 47 These banks had different incentives from those of the widely dispersed creditors in the US.
They had every incentive to monitor the companies they invested in, calling management to account at the earliest signs of distress. coordination problems between banks, stepping in only once the stakeholders had decided that they were no longer willing to finance the business, to provide the necessary procedure to enable the business and assets, or assets, to be sold to a third party.
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In 1998 (1982) Cmnd 8558 included a new collective procedure for rescuing the company as a going concern, administration, but this was motivated by concerns as to the position where there was no security control rights. The concern emerged (based largely on theoretical analysis and perhaps without much empirical support) 54 that rather than persevering with a restructuring, the banks may be incentivised simply to put the business into receivership, sell the assets and realise the proceeds, imposing losses on trade creditors with unpaid liabilities which could have been avoided if the company had been restructured. 55 In effect, we began to worry that our insolvency system measured up poorly to its US cousin.
Ultimately, this was to lead to the abolition of administrative receivership and its replacement with a more collective procedure, administration.
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Moreover, a hierarchy of purposes for administration was inserted, with rescue of the company right at the top.
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But a number of challenges persisted. Although the reforms purported to incentivise management to seek rescue through administration, when a company was placed into administration, an insolvency practitioner replaced management except to the extent that he or she expressly left them to continue their functions (which the administrator rarely did). 58 The insolvency practitioner then controlled the decision to move from rescue of the company to the second purpose of administration, a sale of the business and assets, with a very wide margin of appreciation in his decision-making holder entitled or willing to appoint an administrative receiver rather than concerns with the process of administrative receivership itself, and the procedure was little used. 54 On the lack of empirical evidence see power. 59 Crucially, the lenders continued to control the identity of the insolvency practitioner, who had little incentive to ignore their wishes if he or she were to hope to receive future work. 60 On a market level, although debt-for-equity swaps did happen, they were comparatively rare. 61 More often banks would agree to a series of non-core disposals (to pay down debt) and covenant holidays and revised amortisation schedules (to create space for the company to get back on its feet). Sometimes this would be successful but a company with a high ratio of debt to equity had the cards stacked against it in turning things around, compared with the far more dynamic reshaping of the balance sheet in the US. In short, nothing was to change.
Administration became the insolvency procedure against which banks sought to renegotiate, restructuring generally still occurred out of court and administration was reserved for a sale of the business and assets, or assets, to a third party if the banks decided that they were no longer willing to support the business. considerably greater control over the decision between restructuring, on the one hand, and a sale of the business and assets on the other, functionally
Chapter 11 begins to look considerably more like restructuring and insolvency practice in the UK.
Moreover, increasingly companies which face financial distress have a far greater ratio of debt to equity than companies which faced financial distress in the early days of Chapter 11, and more complex capital structures.
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These complex capital structures often involve 'layers' or 'tranches' of debt regulated by contractual priority agreements between the lenders, known as intercreditor agreements. Debt which ranks first in priority on an insolvency under these intercreditor arrangements is known as senior debt. 'Junior' debt ranks behind the senior debt and attracts higher pricing to reflect the higher risk. In other words, these agreements provide detailed priority and control provisions. Moreover, it is likely that the financial liabilities governed by these arrangements will be sufficient to absorb the losses on the balance sheet, so that there is no need to bring trade creditors into the restructuring plan. 66 This has a number of advantages. but a majority in each supported the restructuring, was to use the scheme of arrangement procedure which had been on the company law statute books since the nineteenth century. 73 The second, where a class of financial creditor (or the equity) was unwilling to support the plan, or was to be offered nothing within it, was to 'twin' the scheme of arrangement with a pre-packaged administration. 74 In a pre-packaged administration, the administrator is introduced to management before appointment, observes the negotiation of a sale from the side lines, satisfies him or herself that the sale offers the best way forward and implements it immediately upon appointment. In a restructuring scenario, the pre-packaged administration is used to 'sell' the operating subsidiaries comprising the business to a new company owned by those stakeholders to whom equity has been allocated in procedures to achieve a Chapter 11-style debt restructuring instead.
Implications of Market Changes for Bankruptcy Theory

A Implications of the Distressed Debt Market
Let us turn now to the implications of these new market dynamics for bankruptcy theory. The difference between the value of the company if it is sold and the proceeds distributed and the value if it is restructured and continues to trade is known as the restructuring surplus. As we have seen, it has traditionally been a principal objective of Chapter 11 to capture it by two mechanisms: by imposing a strong, automatic stay on filing (so that senior creditors are prevented from taking enforcement action), and by providing management with strong control rights (on the assumption that they will prefer a restructuring to a sale). As we have also seen, each of these mechanisms is under threat. But the question arises: does it matter?
Specialist distressed debt funds regularly raise money from investors on the promise of high returns, and are thus focused on maximising profit.
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76 And it is interesting to note here that a shift occurs from a 'manager-displacing' regime in the terms of Skeel's account in 'An Evolutionary Theory' (n 13) as Britain moves from a 'concentrated creditor' model of governance to a more dispersed creditor universe consistent with the analysis advanced by Armour, Cheffins and Skeel in 'Corporate Ownership Structure' (n 28). The critical point is that although what may appear to be the principal regime for restructuring in English insolvency law (administration) remains apparently manager-displacing, the way in which the procedures are used in action results in a system which is at least manager-implemented. Negotiations for a restructured bargain can then get underway in earnest.
Distressed debt investors who trade in may have different investment strategies. 79 Some will buy debt at a deep discount to par or face value in the expectation that the price of the debt, or the equity it is swapped into, will trade up in the secondary market in anticipation of, or after, a successful restructuring, such that they will be able to sell this debt or equity at a profit.
This is a comparatively short term investment horizon. Others seek to capture the difference between the sale price of the business today (reflected in the price at which debt is trading in the market) and the sale price after things have settled down in two or three years. These investors seek to buy up debt which they regard as trading cheaply, having regard to their own assessment of the prospects for the business, and to make maximum profit (often far in excess of the face value of the debt) after deleveraging the balance sheet through a debt-for-equity swap, fixing certain operational issues in the business or simply waiting until the market has recovered, before selling or floating the company. In both cases, as Michelle Harner puts it, 'Investors generally realize a gain on distressed debt investments when the debtor achieves, or the market anticipates, a successful turnaround'.
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If the distressed debt market will seek to exploit any potential restructuring surplus, there should be no need for the law either to provide a moratorium or to steer creditor choice towards a restructuring and away from a sale. Distressed debt investing provides a means for those who no longer wish to remain invested in a firm with a new risk profile to exit without the cost and risk of enforcement and sale. It restricts the sale of assets to third parties, and distribution of proceeds amongst creditors, to those situations where the market identifies no restructuring surplus, with the market selecting which companies are able to survive and which companies should be liquidated.
Yet when we turn to the US literature something of a puzzle emerges. company may propose a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization (in a large case typically a debt-for-equity swap) pursuant to section 1129 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 82 Thirdly, it may propose to sell its business and assets, or assets, pursuant to a Chapter 11 liquidating plan.
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Finally, it may propose a rapid sale of the business and assets pursuant to section 363 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 84 The US literature reports an increase in these rapid section 363 sales of businesses and assets as a result of senior, secured, distressed debt investor control. 85 This suggests that the traditional concern that senior, secured creditors may prefer enforcement of security and sale over preservation of the restructuring surplus is alive and well. Yet it is an intuitively surprising conclusion that the distressed debt investor will be happy with the profit captured between the amount paid for the debt and the amount received on an enforcement of security and sale of the assets to a third party, in circumstances where the market sees the potential for a restructuring surplus which will either be reflected in the trading price of the debt or the trading price of the equity allocated in the restructuring, or reflected in the ultimate sale price for the company once it has traded out of a difficult market with an appropriate capital structure.
Reading the US literature with this puzzle in mind, it is difficult to unpick the story because many authors refer interchangeably to a section 363 sale of the business to some of the financial creditors, and a section 363 sale of the business and assets to a third party, without distinguishing between the two and without identifying which assets and liabilities were transferred in the sale. 86 In large and larger mid-cap company restructurings business to a third party, together with those assets and liabilities which the third party is prepared to assume, leaving other trade liabilities unpaid and providing cash proceeds which are only sufficient to compensate secured, financial creditors. In the UK, at least, most schemes of arrangement 'twinned' with pre-packaged administrations in large and larger mid-cap cases fall into the first category. In other words, they do not result in the sale of a financially distressed, but economically viable, business to a third party for cash, with losses for trade and other creditors which could have been avoided if a restructuring had been pursued instead. Functionally, they are debt for equity swaps amongst financial creditors.
We may still have concerns about a debt restructuring implemented via section 363 (rather than through a Chapter 11 plan in the US), 87 or via a pre-packaged administration sale in the UK. 88 We may be concerned that distressed debt investors (for who speed is of the essence) have taken legal procedures which were developed to facilitate a better realisation of the assets and adapted them to achieve a quick and dirty debt restructuring to The ABI Commission report and recommendations recognise that the rise of the distressed debt market, and the rise of secured credit, have both undermined the mechanisms in Chapter 11 which are designed to steer the parties away from a sale and towards restructuring. 101 Crucially, though, the report does not appear to conclude that the distressed debt market operates in large and larger mid-cap cases to identify and capture the restructuring surplus, and reaffirms a commitment to the traditional policy objectives of
Chapter 11 in imposing a stay and steering creditor choice.
First, the Commission recommends a 60-day moratorium on section 363 sales, reinforcing the role of the automatic stay in creating a breathing space for the debtor. 102 Perhaps more significantly, the ABI has seen the potential to develop a new mechanism to control creditor choice between restructuring on the one hand and insolvency on the other. The Commission recommendations suggest that where the business and assets are sold to a third party, a more complex valuation exercise will take place and, if that exercise suggests that there might have been value for other financial creditors if the company had continued to trade and been sold at a later date, senior creditors may be required to give up some of the consideration for the sale to junior creditors, even though any surplus which does in fact emerge will be captured by the purchaser. 103 This would seem to be a powerful new mechanism to steer creditors towards restructuring and away from a sale to a 101 ABI Commission Final Report and Recommendations (n 32) third party for cash, even where the market concludes that that is the right outcome. If we remain sceptical that the distressed debt market is operating so that companies which are susceptible to a debt restructuring are being sold to third parties instead, then more empirical work may be needed to support this policy response.
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It is also notable that the ABI Commission proposes that section 363
'sales' to financial creditors should follow additional requirements, broadly drawn from Chapter 11. 105 This would seem to be aimed at preventing financial creditors from using section 363 to achieve what is functionally a debt restructuring without complying with the requirements for confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganisation. Ultimately, it leads to the question of whether those requirements require some revision in light of new market mechanisms, and this is considered further below.
Rethinking the Theory of Corporate Bankruptcy Law
Having dedicated a considerable portion of this article to considering what modern corporate bankruptcy law does not do in large and larger mid-cap cases, we must now try to set out a new theoretical framework against which it can be assessed.
Notwithstanding the diverse range of creditors which a company may have, this article has argued that none of them is incentivised to implement a sale and enforcement where the distressed debt market has identified a restructuring surplus in a large or larger mid-cap case. It is suggested that the English market provides powerful evidence for this because, notwithstanding the fact that no moratorium is available in schemes of arrangement, there is no clarion call for a moratorium to be introduced. 106 The English approach of a smorgasbord of procedures which financial creditors can choose between appears to have operated well in the financial crisis, and the US approach of a single gateway which all financially distressed companies must squeeze through does not appear to be necessary in order to enable viable businesses to continue to trade. Thus the first thing we might do is impose an analytic divide between the role of corporate bankruptcy law when the market does not see a restructuring surplus (which we shall call an insolvency), and the role of corporate bankruptcy law when it does (which we shall call a restructuring). We might then consider whether different roles have developed for corporate bankruptcy law in large and larger mid-cap cases in the two situations.
Where a financially distressed company approaches its lenders in order to seek a new bargain, but the existing lenders are not willing to continue to support it and the distressed debt market does not consider that there is a restructuring surplus to be captured, corporate bankruptcy law's role looks much the same as before. It is in everyone's interests that the money which is tied up in this failed business is extracted and redeployed elsewhere. Corporate bankruptcy law provides a stay, or moratorium, so that the business can be kept together and sold as a going concern wherever possible, in order to maximise the amount of capital which is redeployed. It also provides the priority rules according to which the proceeds are distributed and remains concerned that this redeployment of capital does not result in externalities, such as the cost of lost jobs, which ought properly to be taken into account in assessing whether the overall amount of capital which is redeployed is maximised. Similarly, corporate bankruptcy law is concerned not just with the external allocation of capital (ensuring that capital is allocated to companies best able to use it) but also internal allocation of capital (the investment of capital within a company). Thus it imposes duties on directors to ensure that capital is not invested in risky projects designed only to further shareholder interests, and it adjusts payments made in the vicinity of insolvency to reduce incentives to favour some stakeholders over others. 107 This rather ambitiously pithy summary of the role of corporate bankruptcy law in an insolvency situation would be as familiar to an insolvency scholar in 1986 as it is today. We would include any sale of the business and assets, or assets, and the transfer of only some of the liabilities to a third party on this side of the analytic divide. This Corporate bankruptcy law has a different role, however where the market concludes that the company is worth more if it continues to trade.
Ordinarily, a period of debt trading will have ensued, in which some financial creditors have left and new creditors have arrived, and it remains for a new bargain to be struck so that the company can emerge with an appropriate capital structure. However, negotiations over the new bargain are highly likely to arrive at a classically deadlocked position. Deadlock arises in restructuring negotiations where no party is prepared to compromise, but no party has the ability to compel the other to agree. 108 In an earlier piece the author described the 'hyper rationality' of distressed debt investors, 109 in other words their desire to capture every last crumb of their slice of the pie. At the same time, financial creditors and equity in the junior layers of the capital structure have little incentive to agree to a plan in which they receive no, or only a nominal, allocation. 110 Moreover, the fluid nature of the creditor group, and the lack of a long-standing relationship between debtor and creditor, both contribute to making resolution more problematic. 111 Finally, as explained above, whilst other types of financial creditor are not incentivised proactively to enforce and sell, they may continue to prefer enforcement and sale to a restructuring plan. 112 Overall, compromise is difficult to achieve and negotiations can easily become protracted.
The state has an interest in unlocking this deadlock position because it wishes the maximum amount of capital to be redeployed in the economy as rapidly as possible. Thus it stands ready to provide the tools to force dissenting creditors, or hold outs, to accept a transaction so that the restructuring can be implemented. In this view, modern restructuring law provides a deadlock resolution procedure. In the US we would include a debt restructuring implemented via a 'sale' of the entire business to the financial creditors pursuant to section 363 of the US Bankruptcy Code or a
Chapter 11 reorganization plan on this side of the analytic divide and in the UK we would include a debt restructuring pursuant to a scheme of arrangement, a scheme of arrangement 'twinned' with a pre-packaged administration sale or a standalone pre-packaged administration sale to some of the financial creditors. Secondly, and more controversially, corporate bankruptcy law must decide the basis on which it will impose a restructuring plan on dissenters.
Where the restructuring takes the form of a debt-for-equity swap amongst financial creditors (and potentially shareholders) this is a difficult question because the creditors and shareholders who receive equity in the debt-forequity swap are changing the nature of their investment, but they are not crystallising a real economic loss. They will have the residual interest in the company and only once the company is floated or sold will it be clear how much of the debt they have recovered (and how much profit they have made It is suggested here that whether the scholar, practitioner or policy maker relates to the progressive school or the law and economics movement, he or she only cares about the allocation of losses amongst these large, sophisticated financial creditors if it has an impact on (i) the total cost of credit (ii) the depth and strength of the finance market (meaning whether any constraints on the availability of finance will emerge) and (iii) the availability of equity financing, for healthy companies. These are complicated questions because the capital structures which the law supports must also match the risk and reward appetite of the providers of finance within a jurisdiction. there is a greater profit to be captured on an enforcement sale and distribution of proceeds in the US than in the UK. Or it may be that more of the section 363 'sales' to financial creditors described in the US literature implicate trade creditors, even in large and larger mid-cap cases, than is the case in a scheme of arrangement 'twinned' with a pre-packaged administration in the UK. Finally concerns raised most prominently by Harvey Miller will benefit from examination, as cases which were restructured during the Financial Crisis trade out from it. Mr Miller has argued strenuously that the relatively short term horizon of the distressed debt investors, focused on a rapid exit from the investment within a comparatively short number of years of the restructuring, and the focus on the balance sheet which has been described here, may both have the result that necessary operational restructuring is not undertaken, such that the Traditionally US bankruptcy scholars have agreed that it is a central objective of all bankruptcy law to impose a stay on individual creditor action, so that the business and assets can be kept together and restructured if possible, or sold as a going concern if not. Some scholars have also worried that those near the top of corporate bankruptcy law's order of distributional priority will prefer a rapid sale and distribution of proceeds over a protracted restructuring renegotiation. US federal bankruptcy law provides a strong moratorium and strong management rights to address these concerns.
Powerful bank lenders in the English market have traditionally pointed to the danger that a strong moratorium and strong management rights will both reduce the availability, and increase the cost, of credit for healthy companies and will allow companies which ought to fail to continue to trade. These concerns reflect the concerns of law and economics scholars in the US (and the debate between the progressive school and the law and economics movement in that jurisdiction) and have been influential in the development of English corporate bankruptcy law.
Significant changes in the market in both jurisdictions have appeared to be bringing law in action closer together -indeed, US and UK restructuring practice has appeared to be meeting in the middle. But the ABI Commission has made recommendations which appear to reaffirm a commitment to a philosophically different approach, and the two jurisdictions may yet grow apart again.
This article has suggested that the new market dynamics largely take care of the old policy concerns in large cases. It has argued for a strong, analytic divide between the role of corporate bankruptcy law in the insolvency of large and larger mid-cap companies (when the financial creditors are no longer willing to support it and new creditors cannot be found) and its role where the financial creditors are willing to support the business, but their debt arrangements must be restructured. It has suggested that a new set of concerns arise, which are broadly the same whatever view one takes of the need to protect jobs and more vulnerable trade creditors on the one hand, and the need to protect the state of the finance markets for healthy companies on the other. However, it is recognised that this analytic divide is limited to large and larger mid-cap over-leveraged companies, and the article has suggested the need to think about small and medium sized companies separately. It has also noted the need for further empirical research, and has sounded a note of caution for future adaptations in the finance market.
